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The Critique of the Ideology Underlying the Slogan 
“Run like a business” 
 
 
Abstract. The paper criticizes the ideology behind New Public Management movement that 
prefers market to government, private company to public institutions. The study sums up the 
main arguments of this ideology, based mostly on an overly simplified version of neoclassical 
economics and attempts to provide a structured inventory of counter arguments. Counter 
arguments first attack the myth of the general superiority of the market and the firm. Secondly, 
it is argued that government is different. Thus, even if market and firm were superior these 
mechanisms still cannot be applied in most parts of government business. 
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Introduction: The Subject-Matter and the Method 
 
In this essay I intend to analyse the ideology underlying the slogan “Run like a 
business” admittedly with a critical sting. Anyone who has dealt with the issues 
of the state and public administration even if in an oscular manner during the 
recent two decades, has hardly been able to evade the encounter with the slogan 
above or the underlying movement of the so-called New Public Management. 
The essence of the New Public Management generally abbreviated as NPM is 
that the classical-bureaucratic method of the functioning of the state should be 
abandoned.1 Instead, the market mechanism and private companies constitute 
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Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H-1014 Budapest, Országház u. 30. 
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   This paper was written within the framework of the project No NKFPG-00075/2005 
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  The paper was originally written in Hungarian for the Politikatudományi Szemle 
(Hungarian Political Science Quarterly). 
 1 A detailed introduction of NPM is not feasible here. For further orientation: Hughes 
(2003) provides a typical practical summary of the application possibilities of New Public 
Management; whereas Perry [Perry, J. L. (ed.): Handbook of Public Administration, San 
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the ideal. According to the underlying philosophy: The market is always better 
and more efficient than the state, companies are always more efficient than 
public administrative organs. More market and less state are always more 
beneficial for the society. 
 The recognition of more abstract theoretical approaches behind NPM as 
an applied theory pertaining to public administration is not difficult. NPM 
demonstrates an obvious relation to the conception of neo-liberal-neoclassical 
economics and generally to mainstream economics, which construes the market 
as an optimal society-organisational principle.2 It is the frame of reference and 
especially the methodological establishment of principles of this economics, 
i.e., the departure from the rationally acting individual maximising exclusively 
his/her individual profits that is applied by Public Choice theory, scilicet, the 
Public Choice Theory to the public sphere and the state. Public Choice has 
entailed a new approach in the analysis of political relations and within that of 
the functioning of the state and has reached several significant conclusions.3 
Of course, the departure principally destines the conclusion that the state is 
less efficient in comparison with the market. In his work quoted several times, 
Niskanen4 proved on the basis of the mathematical apparatus of economics that 
state services do not work efficiently, because they provide larger supply than 
the market optimum. From a somewhat divergent (otherwise not proved) 
departure point, but with similar methods Migue–Belanger5 reached the 
 
                                                     
Francisco, 1989] is a scientific and huge volume, which examines all the relevant issues of 
public administration via the perspective of NPM. Pollitt-Boukaert [Pollitt, Ch.–Bouckaert, 
G.: Public Management Reform. A Comparative Analysis. Oxford, 2000] provides the 
comparative introduction, analysis and assessment of the public administrative reforms of 
the recent decades. A short introduction and assessment of NPM techniques is provided by 
Hajnal [Hajnal, Gy.: Teljesítmény-orientáció a közigazgatási reformokban. Nemzetközi 
tapasztalatok a második világháború utáni időszakban (Performance Achievement Orientation 
in Public Administrative Reforms. International Experience in the Period after World 
War II)]. Magyar Közigazgatás, 49 (1999) 289–299,  361–370, 426–435] and with a positive 
attitude by Horváth, M. T.: Közmenedzsment (Public Management). Budapest–Pécs, 2005. 
 2 Milton Friedman, the most famous economist of the era can be considered an 
emblematic figure of this approach. The lengthy entry of Wikipedia dealing with him 
provides a good summary of his work and thinking. 
 3 A good summary in Hungarian is Johnson [Johnson, D. B.: A közösségi döntések el-
mélete (The Theory of Public Choice). Budapest, 1999.] In English Lane [Lane, J.-E. (ed.): 
Bureaucracy and Public Choice. London, 1987.] focuses expressly on the role of the state.  
 4 Niskanen, W. A.: Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago, IL, 1971. 
 5 Migue, J. L.–Belanger, G.: Toward the General Theory of Managerial Discretion, 
Public Choice, 17 (1974), 27–47. 
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conclusion that the quantity of state and public services is not, but their prices 
are higher than the market optimum. That is, they agree that state and public 
services are not efficient, but they disagree concerning the question in what this 
manifests itself. In this essay, it is obviously impossible and unnecessary to 
enter into the introduction of neoclassical economics and Public Choice Theory. 
Flashing light on the ideal span ranging from theory to practice, from general 
to concrete state and public administration describable with the formula of 
“neoclassical economics → Public Choice Theory → New Public Management” 
(NPM) was necessary, since the ultimate measures of value and the claims of 
NPM basically follow this span. The critique of ideology needs to examine not 
so much concrete techniques as the underlying „philosophy”. 
 The acknowledged method and style of this essay is a critique of ideology. 
In this essay, I will examine and criticize the set of ideas underlying NPM. I 
will grasp this doctrine as an ideology, since I don’t intend to deal with it as a 
scientific paradigm. Since, on the one hand, it is questionable for several reasons, 
whether it is a paradigm.6 Since, on the other hand, I do not intend to examine 
it as a scientific achievement. Namely, in this case generalising statements are 
always questionable, since differences among authors always obtain. How-
ever, I am exclusively interested in the foundational idea by reason of its effect. 
Namely, the market ideal has basically determined the mentality of recent decades. 
NPM has been a manifestation of the Zeitgeist with respect to the state. We 
have witnessed the interesting, however, not unequalled case in history7 that 
the conceptions related to the management of the state were determined by an 
ideology sharply opposed to the state. 
 The critical approach proceeds remarkably from my personal partiality. As 
a researcher of public administration, I am partial to the state and I consider its 
working necessary and useful. The method of ideology criticism, which is 
without doubt somewhat obscure and has a neo-Marxist overtone, seems to be 
adequate, since in this context my affirmative bias to the state rather reinforces 
than diminishes the capacity of the revelation of reality. Namely, following 
discursive logic, I will attempt below to expose the weak points of the view 
opposed to mine. 
  
 6 Gow, J. I.–Dufour, C.: Is the New Public Management a Paradigm? Does It Matter? 
International Review of Administrative Sciences (IRAS), 66 (2000) 573–597. 
 7 The short initial period of the communist attempt was characterised by such an 
ideological approach. 
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 In the course of that, I will dwell on three main subjects: the idealisation 
of the market as a general social mechanism, the idealisation of the market as 
en economic mechanism and efficiency ideal, finally, the idealisation of the 
corporate as an efficient organisation. (Besides, I will roughly refer to the 
features of the prevalence of NPM in Hungary.) In the three cases (a) I will 
reconstruct the major claims of the ideology pertaining to the market and 
companies, (b) then I will examine the reality content of these claims in them-
selves (c) and how these correlate with the state and public administration.  
 
 
The Market as an Ideal Social Mechanism 
 
The myth of the market often reaches beyond economy in narrow terms. 
Below, I will survey these proposals. Such universal virtues of the market are 
emphasised especially by the so-called Viennese economic school, which at 
the same time condemns the state-bureaucratic solutions. This circle includes 
Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises and partly Joseph Schumpeter. The 
arguments for the market are summarised especially in the volume “Road to 
Serfdom” written by Hayek published in 1944. Besides, several neo-liberal 
economists frame similar thoughts, such as Milton Friedmann.  
 
The market as an original human relation 
 
The functioning of the market is often regarded as a relation, which implies 
some primeval condition. The natural condition of rational individuals wishing 
to maximise their profits is competition, exchange and the surmounting market 
mechanism. In this constellation, the emergence of the state is some perversion, 
the occupation of an aggressive, but in fact negative entity on a more useful, 
primeval mechanism. 
 It is not problematical to realise, however, that the most profitable activity 
in an economic competition not limited legally or by the state is the skinning 
of others, since this promises saliently high returns with low costs. From the 
robbed value, helpers can be hired, relying on whom even more people can be 
skinned. Therefore, this is the competition of robbers, which will shortly lead 
to an oligopolistic situation: the reign of some robber barons. If any of the 
robber barons grasps the power over the others, the state may be established. 
In this sense, theoretically we may infer that the market was the primary 
form. It is another issue that judging from history, ancient societies were not 
characterised by the endeavour to maximise individual profits. Instead, the 
behaviour was determined by the community and community norms, in which 
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self-interest and competition were considered deviances disregarding rare 
exceptions. (On the non-market logic of exchange in pre-modern societies: 
Bourdieu8.) 
 
The myth of the invisible hand and the prisoner’s dilemma 
 
According to the conception closely related to the above, the genuine great 
merit of the market mechanism is that it channels the acts of individuals 
inevitably following their self-interest as a specific co-ordinational mechanism 
to a sort of social optimality-balance. It offers a solution for the contradiction 
between individual selfishness and community welfare, which various utopias 
drawing primarily on morals tried to solve, each time unsuccessfully. Concerning 
this appealing idea, doubts arise with full knowledge of the prisoner’s dilemma. 
This type of strategic games, which has been in the centre of the concern of 
social sciences during the recent decades, delineates the situation, in which the 
decisions of rational profit-maximising individuals in their sum lead to the 
worst possible disentanglement on a community level.9 
  
 8 Bourdieu, P.: (ed.): A gyakorlati észjárás. A társadalmi cselekvés elméletéről (“Practical 
Thinking. On the Theory of Social Action”). Budapest. 2002. 
 9 See, e.g., Axelrod, R.: The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York, 
1984. In Hungarian: Hardin, R.: A kollektív cselekvés mint megegyezéses, N szereplős 
fogolydilemma (Collective Action as an Agreed Prisoner’s Dilemma with N Participants). 
In: Csontos, L. (ed.): A racionális döntések elmélete (The Theory of Rational Decisions). 
Budapest, 1998. 191–207. 
  The prisoner’s dilemma pertains to the situation, when two criminals, who were once 
involved in a “make” together, but don’t know each other, are arrested. Since without the 
confession of at least one of them, this crime cannot be proved, only a much lighter crime, 
the following choice is proffered to the two captives separately. If one confesses but the 
other does not, one will be released in the scope of plea bargain, whereas the other captive 
will be sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. If both captives confess, each will receive 7 
years. If neither of them confesses, each will receive 1 year. They are informed that the 
other party is presented the same conditions. The situation is illustrated by the following 
diagram: 
 
 X - confesses (competes) X – does not (cooperate) 
Y–confesses (competes) 7(X) – 7(Y)  10(X) – 0(Y) 
Y–does not (cooperate) 0(X) – 10(Y) 1(X) – 1(Y) 
 
It is demonstrable that whatever one of the parties chooses to do (whether confesses or 
not), the other party will be better off with confessing. Thus, this is the rational attitude for 
both of them separately. At the same time, this is the worst possible solution (adding up 
the received number of years).  
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 It is a typical prisoner’s dilemma situation, when among market actors the 
question arises, whether they should cheat the other or not, taking into account 
that this question arises in the other party, as well. It can be easily understood 
that if we posit pure market relations, individual profits can be generally 
increased by cheating the other, therefore, the actors of the market will follow 
this path. (As we saw, robbing the other promises even more profits.) On a 
social level, however, this is not in the least optimal or efficient. We daresay 
this is the worst possible condition of a society. 
 It is by no means certain that the social encounter of profit maximising 
individuals will lead to optimality on a social level, but it may frequently launch 
contrary processes. These issues, primarily, the issue which factors lead to 
market optimality and which give rise to opposing tendencies are dealt with 
by Douglas North10 with convincing conceptual clarity. North claims that the 
prevalence of the negative consequences of the prisoner’s dilemma situation 
is especially possible if (a) the participants do not “meet” generally and 
recurrently, (b) if the participants do not know the former behaviour of each 
other (in similar situations), (c) if the number of the participants is especially 
high. We can easily recognise that this description fits the ideal-typical market 
transactions. We can consequently infer that the market would be unable to 
function on its own. 
 Indeed, the basic condition of the functioning of the market is that the state 
guaranteed the safety of property including the necessary keeping (e.g., real 
estate) the registers and the activities related to division and other transactions. 
Besides, the state is also necessary as the ultimate guarantor of compliance 
with contracts.11 
 
Other “moral” advantages of the market 
 
The market is the field of freedom, self-sufficiency, responsibility, but at the 
same time of equality, since it is not characterised by hierarchic arrangement, 
but by the exchange based on the free will of equal parties and by competition
  
 10 North, D. C.: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, 
1990. mainly: 11–35. 
 11 The role of the state as a guarantor of the functioning of the market is more and 
more acknowledged, although not emphasised by neoclassical economic textbooks. E.g., 
the university textbook of Stone published recently and used widely, ranging up to 700 
pages, devotes a whole page to these two conditions, although with specific overtones 
(e.g., individual ownership is better than community ownership, etc.). Stone, G. W.: Core 
Economics. New York, 2008. 83–84. 
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pursued with equal conditions. The enterprise is free. For the entrepreneur, 
the market is a field on which he can reach autonomous decisions and have 
them weighed in the balance. For the consumer, the market offers the oppor-
tunity of free choice as opposed to the bureaucratic-monopolistic state services 
(e.g., panel doctors, schools). The background to all this is the impersonal, 
thus unbiased market mechanism, which measures each party with the same 
standard. 
 In fact, however, as the sharp criticism of Perrow12 demonstrates, in the 
market economy the overwhelming majority of people doesn’t work as an 
entrepreneur, but as an employee of a frequently huge organisation, in a stiff 
and sometimes rather relentless hierarchy, while s/he is existentially exposed 
to this organisation. 
 It is worth mentioning that big companies determine the everyday lives of 
people to a rather great extent. We are exposed to monopolies (e.g., water, 
gas, electricity), banks, etc. The power of these market organisations can be 
greater than that of the state, and as such, they threaten individual freedom not 
less, than the state itself. However, while the liberal state and the Rechtsstaat 
has established the institutional guarantees (institutional structures, fundamental 
rights, publicity), which provide safeguards vis-a-vis the excessive power of 
the state, these guarantees are totally absent vis-a-vis the economic power of 
concentrated capital,13 which has gradually gained ascendancy over the state, 
as well. Later I will treat at length that choice on the part of the consumer is 
sometimes illusory, since the consumer does not have sufficient information 
to make a good decision and this is expressly impeded by market mechanism. 
 An argument for the market is its impersonality, which eliminates personal 
dependence and defencelessness, as opposed to e.g., the decisions of the state. 
It is worth mentioning here that this is an impersonal mechanism, which today 
decides this way, tomorrow that way, and there is no appeal against its decisions 




 12 Perrow, Ch.: Szervezetszociológia (Organisation Sociology). Budapest, 1994. 6–7. 
 13 The “legal realist” movement recognised this in the USA as early as in the 1930s. 
Therefore, it assigned a greater role to the state as the factor that can rescue the individual 
from the reign of big companies. Gordon, R. W.: Willis’ American Counterparts: The 
Legal Realists’ Defence of Administration. University of Toronto Law Journal. 55 (2005) 
405–425. 
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The market and democracy 
 
The market is the world of equal and free people. Therefore, the market is also 
the basis of the democratic political order, so far as it trains people for self-
sufficiency, secures independence financially and intellectually, schools people 
in being equal with others, etc. The market is positioned opposed to the extremely 
hierarchic state-bureaucratic establishment, the dreadful examples of which 
(e.g., in the age of Hayek) were the totalitarian states. 
 The relation of economy and democracy has been raised by political 
scientists and political sociology, as well. Lipset14 examined the issue already 
since the 50s. Nevertheless, he did not mention the functioning of the market, 
he considered financial affluence and the absence of too great social differences 
much more important, while the latter is not the characteristic of the pure 
market. Whereas, the empirical research based on mathematical statistical 
procedures by Lane-Ersson15 examined the issue and the democratic establish-
ment demonstrated significant correlation not only with welfare, but with the 
functioning of the market. The correlation, however, does not refer to a cause 
and effect relation. It is easily conceivable that a third factor underlies both 
factors. (Weber, for instance, would possibly make a guess for the protestant 
ethic.) In a summary, we can state that empirical data by no means refute the 
supposition that the market is the basis of democracy, but they do not fortify it 





Below, I will demonstrate what the optimality and the efficiency of the market 
mean. This is interesting because their natures are generally unknown for experts 
dealing with the state and public administration (typically political scientists 
and lawyers) and for politicians, which gives rise to misunderstandings. Sub-
sequently, I will examine to what extent this notion of efficiency is applicable 
to the state and to its part, i.e., public administration. Eventually, I will prove 
at relatively great length that the market does not function according to its 
efficiency criterion, either. The the market ideal (as opposed to the state) is 
simply a myth. 
 
  
 14 Lipset, S. M.: Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics. Baltimore,1960. 27–
63. 
 15 Lane, J.-E.–Ersson, S.: Democracy. A Comparative Approach. London, 2003.  
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Pareto optimality as an efficiency criterion 
 
When economists talk about the efficiency and optimality of the market, they 
refer to a specific type, the so-called Pareto optimality.16 The Pareto optimal is 
the state, which cannot be changed without incurring that somebody’s situation 
gets worse. Accordingly, the market is such a state. This is relatively easy to 
understand, since the market is established on the logic of exchange. It is 
worth exchanging for those concerned until they are better off with exchange 
and can increase their so-called utilities. Nevertheless, the exchange will not 
supervene, if it is not advantageous for any of the parties any longer. On the 
basis of the same logic, the consumer chooses from the competing products, 
and on the basis of the same logic, the manufacturer decides which product to 
manufacture with which input composition. 
 Although, in case of the market a large number of actors exchange a large 
number of products, for the sake of perspicuity, the Pareto optimality is 
generally illustrated as a relationship of two actors. Diagram 1. demonstrates 
the Pareto optimality as a division between two persons. 
 The diagram illustrates the potential manners of division between X and Y. 
The Pareto optimal points can be found on the curve delineated by points A–
E–B. This cannot be surpassed (since it would require e.g., more products to 
be distributed), therefore, Point D denotes an unfeasible solution. Whereas, a 
move from Point C is possible (upwards or to the right), so that it entailed the 
increase of efficiency, that is, it led to a better solution both for X and Z.  
 
  
 16 Below, I am obliged to venture into the area of economics, although I am not an 
economist. Let it be said in my defence that economists do the same, when they make 
statements concerning the state. Of course, I learnt economics and strove to get a grip of 
the related literature at least as an interested dilettante. The statements concerning 
neoclassical economic arguments draw primarily on Baumol-Blinder [Baumol, W. J.–
Blinder, A. S.: Economics. Principles and Policy. Dryden Press, Philadelphia, 1994] 
although, I have naturally surveyed other textbooks, as well [eg., Stone: op. cit.] In 
Hungarian the most often quoted volume is Samuelson-Nordhaus [Samuelson, P. A.–
Nordhaus, W. D.: Közgazdaságtan (Economics). Budapest, 2005], which is essentially the 
first comprehensive work introducing the neoclassical economic theory in Hungarian. 
Since then, several other books have been made accessible, some of them written by 
Hungarian authors. 
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Diagram 1. The graphic illustration of the Pareto optimality  
 
The consequences of the Pareto optimality 
  
Let’s have a look at some characteristics of the Pareto optimality! 
 As Diagram 1 demonstrates, each of the A, E and B points is Pareto optimal, 
that is, they comply with the concept of market optimality. However, at Point 
A this optimal state means that everything is owned by Y and X obtains 
nothing, whereas, at Point B the situation is just the opposite. Practically, at 
Point A Y prospers, while X simply starves to death. This is obviously a Pareto 
optimal solution, since Y will not change goods with X, because X has nothing. 
Our sense of justice obviously prefers Point E, at which the two parties are 
making similar use of the goods. However, from a Pareto optimal state, just 
because it is Pareto optimal, it is impossible to move towards another Pareto 
optimal state, at least not on the basis of the logic of market exchange. 
 But what does it mean and why is it that Y owns everything, while X owns 
nothing? Well, this can occur because X cannot sell anything on the market, 
not even his labour, because, for example, he was born disabled. This example 
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balance between production and consumption: those who cannot appear on the 
market as sellers cannot appear as customers, either, thereby, complying with 
the criterion “who does not work, should not eat, either”. It is another issue 
that the market mechanism is insensitive to such questions as why somebody 
doesn’t work or why somebody doesn’t have rich parents.  
 Let’s now see another case! Suppose there is an opportunity to move from 
this Pareto optimal situation that the utility of a person decreases by a 
thousandth, while the affluence of all the other members of society (e.g., 10 
million) doubles. In other words, social welfare may double at the expense of 
the hardly discernible decrease of the affluence of someone. However, this 
move is not possible, since it would mean a budge from the Pareto optimal 
situation. Indeed, why would the self-interested profit-maximising individual 
renounce any small extent of utility in favour of others, even if others’ lives 
improved to a great extent owing to that? 
 These two examples above may demonstrate that with respect to the modern 
state, the Pareto optimality is not only not optimality, but a pitfall, from which 
the society must be released. In my view, the crucial task of the state is to 
release the society from the trap of the Pareto optimality and engender a more 
optimal state for the whole community. 
 In this context, it is worth mentioning that we know other optimality 
criteria and these coincide with our conceptions of the function of the state much 
more. Economic textbooks so far as they mention it, deal with these under the 
headword of social utility functions. Generally, three utility functions are 
specified.17 According to the utilitarian approach related to Jeremy Bentham, 
the total utility of the society needs to be maximised. Each member is equal 
and the extent of social welfare derives from the sum of the affluence of the 
members of the community. In a peculiar manner, positing equality is insensitive 
to inequalities. If a member of the society owns 6 million HUF, whereas, the 
other owns nothing, it is of importance as if both had three million HUF. The 
optimality connected with Rawls reflects a contrary view. According to Rawls, 
the welfare of the society can be defined exclusively by the position of the 
member of the community in the worst situation. The most accepted social utility 
function is positioned between the two approaches above. This, as sharply 
simplified, sets out from the fact that “the profit of the rich individual needs 
to increase at a greater extent than the proportionate to compensate for the 
decrease of the profit of the poor individual.”18   
  
 17 See, e.g., Stiglitz, J. E.: A kormányzati szektor gazdaságtana (The Economics of the 
Government Sector). Budapest, 2000. 121–133. 
 18 Stiglitz: ibid. 127. 
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 It is apparent that optimality can have several other definitions apart from 
the Pareto optimality. While the Pareto optimality conforms to the market 
situation and the logic of the exchange, this does not justify, rather questions 
that we consider it a universal optimality concept, which can and must be always 
and everywhere applied. Although, we can hardly venture the definition of the 
function and the role of the state here, the society and the experts would basically 
agree that the role of the state is guaranteeing the welfare of the community 
and the support of individuals, who got into disadvantaged and defenceless 
situations through no fault of their own, what is more, even the decrease of 
social inequalities. If we consider any of the functions of the state, the Pareto 
optimality as a standard with respect to the state is expressly inadequate. 
What optimality is in case of the market, it can be a phenomenon to be 
avoided and corrected in case of the state. 
 
The conditions of market optimality 
 
Market optimality and optimal functioning has several conditions to be inter-
preted at several levels and from several aspects. Without trying to systematise 




In some cases economists themselves admit that markets don’t function 
perfectly. Generally, however, they think that (a) this scope of imperfections 
can be precisely defined (these are market failures) and (b) in sum their 
importance is relatively low and affect only a minor part of the functioning of 
economy. The most important market failures are as follows: 
– The existence of public goods, when the enterprise is not interested in 
the production of the specific goods, since they cannot be sold as market 
products (e.g., defence, public roads). 
– The existence of monopolies, which produce less more expensively than 
the market price. 
– Externalities, when the market price does not reflect the social value of 
the specific goods. A typical case of the negative externality is pollution 
of the environment, when the value of polluted natural resources does 
not manifest itself either among the costs or in the price. A positive 
externality is e.g., when the trees of the orchardist provide nourishment 
for the bees of the apiarist. 
– The so-called informational asymmetries, when the parties involved in 
the transaction are not equally informed primarily about the features of 
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the given product, e.g., the customer does not know all the essential 
features of the product.  
Further factors also emerge, which may divert the functioning of the market 
from the optimal. Stiglitz19 refers to the problems of the lack of balance, of the 
crises and unemployment, the frequent lack of the perfect competition and the 
queries of the rationality of actors. Weimer–Vining20 mentions the issue of 
temporality: long-term agreements and insurances and generally uncertainty 
and its handling raise conceptual problems. 
 In these areas neoclassical economists admit the imperfection of the market 
and perhaps, although not unconditionally, they approve of state intervention. 
Below, I will formulate doubts and questions beyond these. 
 
The rationality of the actor 
 
According to the departing standpoint of neoclassical economics, the acts of 
the actors proceeding in market economy is characterised-motivated by the 
individual endeavour to maximise profits, rational consideration and decision 
that most perfectly guarantee this. This can be partly valid for enterprises, 
since the market functioning systematically selects those who are not able to 
make average or higher profits. However, positing a rational, profit maximising 
actor can be challenged at several points. Largely in an order of importance, 
these are as follows: 
– preposterous. The informational asymmetries listed among market failures 
seem to be euphemisms. The essence of the problem is not uneven 
informedness, since if either the seller or the customer knows nothing 
about the product, there is no asymmetry, but there is no rational decision 
or market optimality, either. Namely, reaching a rational decision is possible 
in case of perfect informedness. Simon,21 however, in the theory of 
satisfycing decisions proved half a century ago that rational decision is 
not possible, and if it is, it is probably not rational, if we consider it 
from a higher level. (Namely, the collection of information incurs higher 
cost than the saving deriving from the better decision reached this way.) 
 
  
 19 Stiglitz: op. cit. 88–97. 
 20 Weimer, D. L.–Vining, A. R.: Policy Analysis. Concepts and Practice. Upper Saddle 
River, N. J. 1989. 78–93. 
 21 Simon, H. A. (ed.): Korlátozott racionalitás (Válogatott tanulmányok) (Limited 
Rationality. A Selection of Studies). Budapest, 1982. 
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– The decision of a significant part of the actors is not rational. The “end-
users” in the economy are simple average individuals, who are on the 
one hand determining parts of the economic system, on the other hand 
persons embedded in the fabric of society. It is a century-long debate, 
whether we are directed by profit-maximising reckoning or factors coded 
in social culture, briefly, by interests or values. A prominent figure of 
contemporary social science, Jon Elster,22 who is the follower of rational 
positing, demonstrates himself in how many manners the individual departs 
from the rational ideal. This is also supported by empirical research: the 
individual decision-maker, especially in so-called risk situations is almost 
unable to make actually rational decisions.23 It is doubtful what “utility” 
means, which the consumer maximises.24 
– The consumer is unable to make rational decisions. The consumer is most 
rarely aware of the actual features of the purchased product. A significant 
part of the goods, e.g., the so-called trust goods are expressly those the 
content of which cannot be summed up by the “customers”. That is the 
situation in case of the overwhelming majority of services and the products 
that need expertise. The most typical example is healthcare, but we could 
mention the services provided by the lawyer, the accountant, the informa-
tion scientist, the electrician or the plumber. Even the relatively simple 
products are most rarely homogeneous (probably the products of the com-
modity stock exchanges are such), and the differences among them remain 
concealed before use. Besides the difficulties of natural knowledge, the 
manufacturers devote enormous energy to influencing the choice of the 
consumer and they do so according to the sense not via the improvement of 
the otherwise unknowable quality features of the product. Instead, they 
have recourse to the instruments of shaping brand faithfulness, wrapping 
techniques, advertisements, etc. All these “market” techniques intend to 
 
  
 22 In Hungarian: Elster, J.: Savanyú a szőlő (Sour Grapes). In: Csontos (ed.): A racio-
nális döntések elmélete. op. cit.; Elster, J.: A társadalom fogaskerekei (The Cog-Wheels of 
Society). Budapest, 1995; Elster, J. (ed.): Válogatás Jon Elster műveiből (A Selection of 
the Works of Jon Elster). Budapest, 2002. 112–153.  
 23 Hirshleifer, J.–Riley, J. G.: A bizonytalanságban hozott döntések elemei (The Elements 
of Decisions Reached in Uncertainty). In: Csontos (ed.): A racionális döntések elmélete. 
op. cit. 25–61.; Tversky, A.–Kahneman, D.: Kilátáselmélet: A kockázatos helyzetekben ho-
zott döntések elmélete (Prospect Theory: The Theory of Decisions Reached in Hazardous 
Situations). In: Csontos (ed.): ibid. 82–112. 
 24 Coase, R. H. (ed.): A vállalat, a piac és a jog (The Company, the Market and the 
Law). Budapest, 2004. 13. 
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divert the consumer (obviously with success) from the rational decision. 
The inherent element of the market competition is this intention to distort 
the competition. 
All this has a further impact on the functioning of the market. 
 
The market price reflects the social value 
 
The basic condition of the optimal functioning of the market is that the market 
price should reflect the social value. This is by no means so in the case of 
externalities. Although, the relation is somewhat more indirect, perhaps it can 
be understood that informational asymmetries also entail the deformation of 
the prices, especially in case of the problem described above, namely, when 
the consumer does not know what s/he buys. The myth that the price somehow 
mediates the social value, for me is undermined by a concrete example, the 
advertisement. Although, advertising experts endeavour “to sell” this activity 
as providing information, it is not difficult to understand that the information 
value of advertisements is rather low (so far as a happy family, a lovely 
pussycat and a beautiful young woman has information value in case of e.g., a 
mobile phone, a car and frozen dumplings), what is more, their role is often 
expressly misrepresentation. Nevertheless, billions are spent on advertisement. 
Is advertisement really one of the most socially valuable activities? The value 
of the advertisement is that by manipulating customers’ preferences, companies 
may increase their profits at the expense of others via the detachment of 
consumption from market rationality. Let’s apprehend that market failures 
related to advertisements don’t explain the difference between market price 
and social utility. This market segment with increasing share proves in itself 
the untenableness of the argument that “the price on the whole and in the long 
run reflects the social value”. The price reflects merely the momentary market 




The prerequisite of the functioning of the market is competition. An extremely 
great number (an infinite number) of manufacturers and customers can be 
found on the ideal market. One of the basic theses of Marxist economics is that 
the market exhausts itself via the inevitable monopolisation. This is valid, if the 
marginal and average unit cost decrease owing to the increase of production 
(via the manufacture of not only 100, but 1000 buses). Therefore, neoclassical 
economists posit that with the increase of production, the marginal cost 
curve will not decrease to a certain point, but increase after that. Nevertheless, 
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this astonishing phenomenon undoubtedly requiring explanation is nowhere 
explained–at least in the textbooks I know.25 This needs to be accepted as a fact, 
since the attention is diverted from the fact of the absence of an explanation 
generally via charts and tables. Recently, economists have still commenced the 
examination of not perfectly competing, oligopolistic markets.  
 In fact, perfect competition is improbable for all that, since as we saw the 
goods are exceptionally homogeneous. The competition is less manifest on 
the market of Adidas track shoes. Namely, it is in the rarest cases that we 
encounter perfect competition on the real market, which is the prerequisite of 
the Pareto optimality. 
 
The price of the exchange 
 
The starting point of neoclassical economics is that while production has 
expenses, exchange has no ones. Having recourse to the comparison made by 
Coase,26 who first raised the problem with great impact, this conception is of 
the nature as if we tried to describe the physical phenomena on the Earth 
without positing friction. The functioning of the market cannot be grasped 
without transaction costs, that is, the costs of exchange. This scope encompasses 
search and information costs, bargaining and decision-making costs, control 
and enforcement costs.27 If there weren’t such costs, the existence of companies 
would be unexplainable, since then the manufacture and assembly of machines, 
etc. would be solved by exchange. However, exchange has significant expenses 
and the functioning of the market is shaped significantly via the minimali-
sation of total costs, among them transaction costs. Transaction costs account 
for a considerable part of total costs emerging at the level of society. With 
reference to former empirical research, North28 estimates that to be 45 p.c. 
(almost half) of the national revenues of the USA. This is the sum which 
neoclassical economics doesn’t take account of.  
 The theory of transaction costs is the point of departure of neoinstitu-
tionalist economics. Coase, North and Williamson agree that institutions in 
broad terms (organisations, systems of norms, etc.) are generally adequate for 
the decrease of transaction costs, this is what partly accounts for their existence. 
  
 25 E.g., Stone: op. cit. 183–184. 
 26 Coase: op. cit. 9–53. 
 27 Ibid. 18.  
 28 North: op. cit. 28. 
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Crucial institutions of the decrease of transaction costs are the state and law. 
This conception is reflected by the economic theory of law.29 
  
Optimality in the absence of conditions 
 
For a long time, economists were satisfied with the mathematical deduction of 
the conception that the market is optimal in case of the prevalence of adequate 
conditions. As far as I know, the conditions were not surveyed systematically 
and it was especially not examined how the absence of conditions influences 
the Pareto optimality. In essence, it was supposed that these divert the func-
tioning of the market from optimality only to a small extent and perhaps 
various effects counter-balance each other (with the exception of the distorting 
effect of the state). Whereas, Greenwald-Stiglitz30 proves that the absence of 
conditions not only certainly diverts the functioning of the market from the 
Pareto optimality, but it is frequently diverted to a large extent, which is 
intuitively not expected. They sum up their results as follows: 
 
The paper thus casts a new light on the First Fundamental Theorem of 
Welfare Economics asserting the Pareto efficiency of competitive equilibrium. 
The theorem is an achievement because it identifies what in retrospect has 
turned out to be the singular set of circumstances under which the economy 
is Pareto efficient. There is not a complete set of markets; information is 
imperfect; the commodities sold in any market are not homogeneous in all 
relevant respects; it is costly to ascertain differences among the items; 
individuals do not get paid on a piece rate basis; and there is an element of 
insurance (implicit or explicit) in almost all contractual arrangements, in 
labor, capital, and product markets. […] 
 We have constructed a general model which shows that in all of these 
circumstances, Pareto improvements can be effected through government 
policies, such as commodity taxes. Our methodology not only identifies 
the presence of inefficiencies, but also enables us to identify both the 
appropriate direction of policy intervention and observable measures of 
their successful application. […]  
 We have elaborated a general model, which shows that in all these 
cases a state intervention, such as e.g., the luxury tax facilitates a Pareto 
  
 29 In Hungarian: Cooter, R.–Ulen, Th.: Jog és közgazdaságtan (Law and Economics). 
Budapest, 2005. 
 30 Greenwald, B. C.–Stiglitz, J. E.: Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Informa-
tion and Incomplete Markets. The Quaterly Journal of Economics, 101 (1986) 229–264. 
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improvement. Our method does not simply indicate inefficiency, but helps 
to find the proper direction and method of state intervention. 





The analysis of economic concepts and myths concerning the market served 
primarily the elucidation and critique of the theoretical foundation of NPM. 
This is the ideological background, which generally underlies the conceptions 
related to the mostly negative value of the state and its function possibly 
limited to a narrow scope. The company functioning on the market determines 
primarily the ideal for the NPM, which public administration should follow. 
 Let’s see what constitutes efficiency in case of the company, to what extent 
this efficiency is true and to what extent it can be applied to public administration! 
 
The concept of company optimality 
 
Adapting the concepts of systems theory, company efficiency can be described 
with the formula of OUTPUT/INPUT. This expresses that the working of the 
company is all the more optimal and efficient, the larger output can be reached 
with the less input. Input includes labour force, primary materials, machines 
and energy, whereas output includes the product itself, goods or services. This 
can be expressed financially. Input encompasses costs and expenditure, while 
output encompasses revenues. In this context, it is worth referring to the fact 
that the definition of profit can be described with the same factors: OUTPUT 
(revenues)–INPUT (expenditure), that is, efficiency basically coincides with 
profitability. 
 The efficiency of the company finds meaning on the market. Namely, the 
price of inputs and outputs is determined by the market. That company is 
successful which manufactures expensively marketable products with low costs. 
Positing that prices reflect social utility, that means that an efficient company 
is a company successful on the market and this company is efficient on a 
social level, as well. 
 The efficiency of market mechanism manifests itself in this, as well, since 
it informs the company about its efficiency extremely rapidly and precisely via 
prices. It does not only inform, but it also manages a selective-rewarding 
mechanism. The companies that work inefficiently and utilise relatively too 
much of social property, to which they contribute insufficiently go bankrupt 
and get selected out. 
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The queries of company efficiency 
 
It is probably discernible on the basis of the above that the crucial issue of 
company efficiency is whether the market price reflects social values. We saw 
that in general this is not valid. It is possible therefore that the company is 
efficient according to the market prices, whereas, socially it is not. On the 
basis of the mentioned example: the advertising agency successfully deceiving 
the consumers is especially efficient on the market. Several further facts 
emerge concerning the efficiency of companies. Let me highlight the most 
important ones. 
 
The efficiency of administrative units 
 
In the large and complex corporate system it is basically impossible to determine 
how the specific organisational units contributed to the given extent of efficiency. 
In case of administrative units, it is especially difficult, what is more, impossible 
to determine the extent of their contribution to efficiency or profits. Who can 
tell the extent of the contribution of the accountancy, the HR department etc. 
to the efficiency of the company. The significance of the problem consists in 
the simple fact that public administration and governance are the administra-
tive units of the public, of the society. 
 
The self-interested management 
 
It is a publicly known fact, which coincides with the point of departure of 
economics that individuals within the company generally take not the corporate, 
but their individual interests into consideration. E.g., Tullock31 as one of the 
founding fathers of Public Choice theory claims that climbing a rung of the 
hierarchy is facilitated by intelligence as well as by taking not the corporate, 
but the self-interest (i.e., individual progress) into account. According to 
Tullock, this is less manifest at companies than in public administration, since 
the owner supervises the managers more closely. This argument is less valid 
at e.g., joint ventures. Several scandals of the recent years32 (e.g., Enron) 
revealed that corporate management was interested in nothing else, but their 
own income and bonuses. Crozier33 introduces the role of power games in 
  
 31 Tullock, G.: The Politics of Bureaucracy. Washington D.C.:  1965. 18–21. 
 32 e.g., Enron. 
 33 Crozier, M.: A bürokrácia jelensége (The Phenomenon of Bureaucracy). Budapest, 
1980. 
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organisational dynamics, Perrow34 or Bakacsi35 elucidate that the role of these 
is determining at companies, as well. Essentially, the principal-agent theory 
also dwells on this problem. Therefore, corporate participants are by no means 
motivated by corporate efficiency, thus, corporate dynamics is not necessarily 
characterised by this trend, either. Again, the question is whether the market is 
adequate for coercing companies into efficiency at an acceptable level.  
 
Contingent luck in corporate success 
 
According to the populational-economic trend of organisation theory, from 
among the contingent mutations of companies the one that survives in the 
long run is that which is more capable of adaptation to the changes of the 
environment unpredictable for the company.36 All the management wisdoms 
are in fact hoaxes. Although, the statement is audacious, several facts seem to 
support it, among others e.g., the fact that sharply contradicting management 
theories prevail at the same time and the choice among these is determined 
rather by fashion than tested increase in efficiency.37  
 
The applicability of the corporate model in public administration 
divergence or similarity of public and private management 
 
Are the public and private, i.e., corporate management basically similar or 
divergent? The answers to the question are rather contradictory. Lőrincz, Lajos38 
points out that standpoints traversed historically in one or the other direction. 
 The classical essay most frequently referred to in the science of public 
administration,39 which also draws on former works, recognises substantial 
divergences. Allison outlines public administration as one in which the 
measurement and interpretation of efficiency is difficult, while it needs to 
meet other abstract and concrete requirements. Abstract requirements include 
lawful and democratic working and safeguarding equal treatment, equity, 
  
 34 Perrow: op. cit. 281–288. 
 35 Bakacsi Gy.: Szervezeti magatartás és vezetés. Budapest, 1998.  
 36 Kieser, A. (ed.): Szervezetelméletek (Organisation Theories). Budapest, 1995. 318–35. 
 37 Powell, W.–DiMaggio, P.: The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. 
Chicago, IL, 1991. 26–27. 
 38 Lőrincz L.: Közigazgatási reformok: mítoszok és realitás (The Reforms of Public 
Administration: Myths and Reality). Közigazgatási Szemle, 2007, 3–13. 
 39 Allison, G. T.: Public and Private Managers: Are They Fundamentally Alike in All 
Unimportant Respects? In: Lane, F. S. (ed.): Current Issues in Public Administration. New 
York, NY, 1982. 134–151. 
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openness, etc. These can easily collide with the requirement of efficiency, 
which thereby is only one of the requirements. It is a peculiar paradox that in 
case of public administration these requirements frequently colliding with short-
term efficiency can in the long-run become the pledges of social efficiency. 
Democratism, the safeguards of constitutionality protect from the brutal rationality 
of bureaucracy, which, when distorted into a dictatorship, threatens the whole 
society.40 
 Public administration needs to meet concrete requirements, as well, such as 
the expectations of interested social groups and their interest representatives, 
the branches of judicial and legislative powers. The management of the public 
sphere as manifestly opposed to the business sector takes place by the permanent 
control of the media. Openness also pertains to a broad scope of citizens. 
 There have always been approaches, which emphasise the similarities of public 
and private management. These don’t regard the divergences as important or 
construe them as anomalies. Essentially, this approach characterises NPM, as 
well. Below, I will bring up arguments for the issue why the management of 
public administration as a quasi company is inadmissible.  
 
Efficiency and effectiveness 
 
Via an oversimplification, efficiency refers to the already mentioned OUTPUT/ 
INPUT formula, whereas effectiveness refers to the extent of the achievement 
of a goal. These two factors are the same in case of a company: both coincide 
with the possibly highest profit. What is more, according to market ideology, 
both guarantee an optimal level of social welfare, that is, efficiency on a social 
level. No doubt, in the absence positive social impact, companies could be still 
efficient and effective on the actual market. (See, e.g., successful advertisement 
agencies).  
  A basic concept of the theory of public policy and public administration is 
the separation of efficiency and effectiveness,41 and in another dimension, the 
distinction of efficiency measured and construed on the level of the organisation 
and of the whole of public administration.42  
  
 40 This was referred to by Weber, when he considered more democratically functioning 
states altogether more efficient than the extraordinarily efficient Prussian public administ-
ration. See, Albrow, M.: Bureaucracy. London, 1970. 64. 
 41 Hajnal, Gy.–Gajduschek, Gy.: Hivatali határok – társadalmi hatások. Bevezetés a ha-
tékony közigazgatás módszertanába (Office Boundaries–Social Effects. Introduction into 
the Methodology of Efficient Public Administration). Budapest, 2002. 11–14. 
 42 Lane, J.-E. (ed.): Bureaucracy and Public Choice. London, 1987. 23–24. 
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 We have seen that in case of the activity of administration, efficiency can 
be rarely defined. The application of the OUTPUT/INPUT formula is especially 
difficult in the public sphere, since outputs (public services) generally have no 
actual price, and even expenses can be frequently hardly defined. What is 
even more essential: in the public sphere, the actual value of the output is 
determined by its social effect. Public administration is effective, if it fully 
complies with its objective, the increase of social welfare, since this is the 
objective of public administration. Therefore, effectiveness queries social effect, 
whereas efficiency refers to the amount invested to reach this effect. Of course, 
the amount invested encompasses not only the input of public administration, 
but social expenses as well, of which the company takes no account, unless the 
state charges them to the company. 
 It follows from the above that a specific public administrative organisation 
can be efficient (and even effective in a narrow sense), while it is not efficient 
from the viewpoint of the society, therefore, of the whole public administra-
tion. Thereby, the Labour Office can send unemployed people in great numbers 
to retraining courses (which is one of its major tasks), which work very cost-
efficiently (a lot of people are trained at high level, in a large number of 
hours at low cost). Therefore, the organisation can be considered effective and 
efficient. At the same time, if the content of the training is not adequate (e.g., 
dressmakers are retrained to be miners), the activity will be unsuccessful from 
a general social point of view, and thus, its efficiency will be essentially low. 
 In a summary: in case of the public sphere, the company efficiency index is 
practically incalculable. Since in the public sphere the standard of value of 
the activity is not the financial profit, but the positive social effect, therefore it 
is not really relevant, since the prices do by no means reflect the social value.  
 
Client-orientedness and authority matters 
 
Companies endeavour to meet most of all the consumers’ demands, so that 
their products are chosen. One of the objectives of NPM is the reinforcement 
of client-orientedness, in the area of which results have been achieved the most 
unambiguously. I claim however, that the satisfaction of clients is not necessarily 
an asset.43  
  
 43 I elaborated elsewhere, how peculiar client satisfaction is, which may as well work 
out in opposition to the actual achievement. Gajduschek, Gy.: Módszertani útmutató a 
hivatali ügyfélelégedettség méréséhez (A Methodological Guide to the Measurement of 
Client Satisfaction in Offices). Államreform Bizottság honlapja (Homepage of the State 
Reform Committee), 2005. Here, however, I do not dwell on this.  
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 Is it auspicious if the police is evaluated on the basis of the satisfaction of 
criminals, or if the criminals can choose which investigating authority should 
proceed in their case? Is it a favourable sign that the banks are basically satisfied 
with government control? A part of the tasks of the state is public service, the 
beneficiary of which is the individual citizen (education, healthcare, social 
services, public transport, etc.). In these areas, which developed good half a 
century ago with the appearance of the welfare state, the opinion and satisfac-
tion of those concerned can be an important and relevant index. 
 The other part of state tasks prevailing for thousands of years is the so-called 
authoriative activity, typically various types of law enforcement. Proceeding 
as such, the state intervenes against the client and incurs inconvenience (prohibits, 
obliges, fines, raises taxes, etc.). Although, it does so in favour of the community, 
all the other citizens, but they do not directly appear as clients in this procedure. 
Briefly, the market mechanism attached to “the direct consumer”, which can 
be very useful on the market, may lead to a deformed feedback opposed to 
real assessment in this fairly significant area of state activities.  
 
The market mechanism does not work 
 
The market cannot attend to and has never attended to the majority of state 
tasks. The market is unable to provide public goods. At other times, the market 
optimum obviously departs from the social optimum and from that which the 
large majority of the society considers the social optimum (e.g., everyone should 
get elementary education). 
 We need to remark that most NPM techniques do not dispute this fact. 
Instead, they would sustain the state as a financier, although, the task would 
be expressly performed by the organisations of the business sector or market 
mechanisms would be applied. The explanation of NPM is the increase of 
efficiency. An alternative, not less plausible explanation is that NPM is an 
ideology, which favours enterprises, especially larger business enterprises44 
via opening up new market segments and the generation of large procurments 
for capitalist groups. 
 
  
 44 Farazmand, A.: Privatization and Globalization: A Critical Analysis with Implications 
for Public Management, Education and Training, International Review of Administrative 
Sciences (IRAS), 68 (2002) 355–371.; in Hungarian: Hajnal, Gy.: Igazgatási kultúra és 
New Public Management reformok egy összehasonlító esettanulmány tükrében (Management 
Culture and New Public Management Reforms as Reflected in a Comparative Case Study). 
Ph.D. Dissertation. Manuscript. Budapest, 2004. 34–37. 




Acknowledging that competition is the guarantee for efficiency, this conceptually 
entails that certain companies go bankrupt. Is it acceptable that organisations 
serving the whole society or large communities simply disappear, so that their 
tasks are not performed by any party in the short or long run? E.g., water, 
electricity, gas supply and the drainage system, prisons, the maintenance of 




Of course, it is the most convincing, if we examine empirically whether the 
public or private organisations work more efficiently. This, however, beyond 
the methodological problems encumbering comparative research, is impeded 
by several obstacles. There are relatively few areas, in which we find both 
public and private organisations, and if we do, they frequently appear not to 
perform the same activity (e.g., expensive private schools). For limitations of 
scope, even the rough survey of methodological problems is impossible. 
Instead, I will attempt below to introduce the results of empirical research 
published in this subject-matter in the broadest possible scope. (A more 
detailed summary: Gajduschek.45)  
 Weimer–Vining46 surveyed the publications published before 1989. The 
authors found that from among the reports of research carried out in the scope 
encompassing electricity supply, air travel and fire service, 65 claimed that the 
performance of tasks by private organisations was more efficient and more 
successful and only 7 found that the performance of tasks by a community was 
more efficient, whereas in 19 cases no unequivocal conclusion could be 
reached. Since I did not find a similar comprehensive and summarising study, 
I tried to survey the studies published in the meantime myself. Unfortunately, 
I could identify only 16 empirical comparative studies, but I didn’t find a 
single one, according to which the performance of tasks by a community 
organisation was more efficient. Nevertheless, in the majority of cases 
methodological aspects can be raised, which query the final conclusions. 
  
 45 Gajduschek, Gy.: Közigazgatási eredményesség – Piaci hatékonyság? avagy Alkal-
mazható-e a piaci ideál a közigazgatásban (Success in Public Administration–Efficiency 
on the Market? or, Is the Market Ideal Applicable in Public Administration?). In: Lőrincz L. 
(ed.): Eredményesség és eredménytelenség a közigazgatásban (Success and Failure in Public 
Administration). Budapest, 2009. 67–72).  
 46 Weimer–Vining: op. cit. 195–200.  
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 The other approach is the examination of the effect of NPM. This consists 
in the transfer of the solutions of private managemet and the market mechanism 
to the practice of governance and public administration. Therefore, the question 
can be raised whether efficiency increased as an effect. The data in this case 
are not clear and convincing, either. In the 5th chapter of their book analysing 
the results, Pollitt–Bouckaert47 emphasise that the increase of efficiency can be 
construed on several levels (they distinguish four levels), but unambiguous 
index-numbers cannot be defined on any of the levels and convincing data do 
not obtain. At the same time, NPM seems to have been able to restrain the rate 
of state expenditure increasing for centuries and gradually accelerating in the 
previous decades. The authors also establish that competition situations generally 
improve efficiency disregarding whether we are talking of a public or private 
organisation. It is an interesting but not a surprising statement that while NPM 
considers the satisfaction of costumers one of the most decisive aspects and 
as an effect “client-orientedness” gains ground, according to data, the trust in 
public institutions and public services significantly decreased specifically in 
the countries of NPM.  
 As several experts and more and more simple newspaper articles highlight, 
the price of the contingent increase in efficiency achieved by NPM must be 
paid elsewhere. That price consists in the absence of long-term investments, 
the decrease of safety, the exclusion of problematic clients (vis-a-vis of equal 
access). Of course, NPM affects the whole state, as Rhodes in his article 
establishing a concept (Hollowing out of the state) wrote the state erodes 
mostly as an effect of NPM. This emerges in the absence of co-ordination, the 
sectors function in a fragmented manner and the left hand frequently does not 
know what the right one is doing. The perspicuous relations of responsibility 
dissolve, since instead of the former lucid (bureaucratic) structures, several actors 
in various positions appear, among whom the relations are mostly puzzling 
(contractual, subjected, political, client, etc.). As an effect, the public policy 
making capacity of the centre weakens and the political control over public 
administration, which is the pledge of democratic functioning, also weakens 
considerably.  
 
A rough assessment of the Hungarian situation  
 
In Hungary, NPM evolved at the same time as the change of regime, which 
implied the radical transformation of the functioning of the state and the 
economy. Both the change of regime and NPM channelled the changes in the 
  
 47 Pollitt–Bouckaert: op. cit. 
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same direction: the decline of the role of the state and the reinforcement of 
market processes. Therefore, it would be both theoretically and empirically 
difficult to detach the role of NPM within the process of the change of regime. 
This role may be most identified in the conscious diminution of the state, and 
within this, of public administration and in the maximisation of the opportunities 
of the business sector. 
 The change of regime undoubtedly entailed notable and shocking changes 
in several elements. Beyond the decrease of the power of the state, the changes 
led to the uncertainty of the scope of state. On the other hand, a part of the 
instruments formerly applied for the performance of state tasks became legally 
prohibited, another part of them became socially and management-technically 
inadequate. As for me, I think that the final result of the process is the emergence 
of the impotent state, which is incapable of the performance of its most 
elementary tasks: incapable of the maintenance of order and the enforcement 
of the law.48 
 In line with the change of regime, the establishment of the framework of 
the Rechtsstaat also took place. It may be due to the natural oscillation of the 
pendulum that a kind of hyper-Rechtsstaat was formed with safeguards for 
individual rights (at least on the face of it), which frequently surpass the 
similar institutions of the most developed democracies. From the viewpoint of 
our subject-matter, this entailed that the state and especially public administ-
ration became almost perfectly jeoparadized without its instruments used before. 
It became incapable of control of the illegitimate methods manifesting them-
selves in the business sector. 
 The solutions of NPM were originally introduced in relatively well-
functioning states. Whereas, in post-socialist states NPM in line with the hyper-
Rechtsstaat was thrust on a confused public administration unestablished as to 
its function, structure, functioning and administrative culture. Thereby, NPM 
did not serve the improvement or reconstruction of former solutions (of the 
welfare state), but increased the chaos exclusively in favour of those wishing 
to fish in troubled waters. The practical foundations, on which NPM could 
really contribute to the increase of efficiency, were also missing. The well-
functioning market is missing, as there are several actors (sellers) that can 
perform specific tasks (eg. Road construction). The few existing sellers are not 
reliable. The well-functioning legal system is also missing, in which crystallized 
contractual-institutional techniques exist for the employment of private organi-
  
 48 Gajduschek, Gy.: Rendnek lenni kellene (There Should Be Order). Budapest, 2008. 
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sations for the performance of public tasks.49 Underlying all these, the necessary 
political, administrative and business culture and ethics are missing.  
 As early as in the mid-‘90s, Verheijen50 as a single among foreign experts 
warned of the dangers. Summarising the results of a research which analysed 
the public administrative systems of the Central-Eastern-European region and 
the effect of NPM, he pointed out that  
 – in these countries, where coordination was always a problem, NPM further 
exacerbates it, and beside the absence of the horizontal coordination 
among ministries, generates the absence of vertical coordination; 
 – perplexes totally the otherwise problematic relations of responsibility, 
since NPM intends to supersede bureaucratic responsibility for the utilisation 
of resources by responsibility for achievement, however, in a Central-
Eastern-European context this rather entails the total collapse of the system 
of responsibility; 
 – the continuity so important in public administration is terminated; 
 – NPM reforms lead to the politicisation of public administration in the region. 
The statements of Verheijen seem to be confirmed by the facts. 
 In the absence of significant empirical research, we can merely draw on 
impressions or hypotheses, if we question the main promise of NPM, i.e., the 
increase of efficiency. We know numerous scandalous stories from the press 
encompassing motorway constructions and the procedure of the sale of the 
buildings of public organisations to enterprises, which are then rented by the 
same public organisations, thereby, they reimburse the whole purchase price 
as rent in 2 or 3 years, etc. Therefore, we can hardly attribute an efficiency 
increasing effect to NPM in the region. Carrying things to extremes, it functioned 
as an instrument of the illegitimate privatisation (i.e. stealing) of public property. 
 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this essay, I criticised the ideology of “market-corporate is good, state 
public administrative is bad”, which manifests itself most directly in New Public 
Management, which is supported by mainstream economics and Public Choice 
theory. 
  
 49 Horváth M. T.: A magánszektor és a decentralizáció szerepe a közszolgáltatások 
szervezésében (The Role of the Private Sphere and Decentralisation in the Organisation of 
Public Services). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 54 (1999) 18–35. 
50 Verheijen T.: Commentary on ... ‘Western’ public management. PA Times, 20 
(1997)  3, 12. 
386 GYÖRGY GAJDUSCHEK  
  
 In my hope my arguments have raised doubts concerning the conviction 
that market competition and exchange are some primeval and optimal social 
organisation, which reinforces the greatest virtues of the individual and at the 
same time grounds the democratic establishment. 
 I suppose I have succeeded in undermining the statement that the market is 
really efficient. I think it is even more essential to introduce the conception 
that the specific efficiency of the market, the Pareto optimality cannot be 
applied to state activities, what is more, one of the basic tasks of the state is a 
displacement from the Pareto optimality (if that prevails). 
 The queries concerning the applicability of the corporate ideal may have 
also raised doubts. This can be reinforced by the fact that even if international 
experiences are conflicting, Hungarian experiences, although they are not 
processed scientifically, seem to be unequivocal. Here, NPM has not even 
been increased economic efficiency. On the contrary: NPM has led to waste 
and an increased level of corruption. 
 All these are mere arguments. Concerning NPM, critical voices have been 
more and more emphatic in international special literature for almost a decade, 
which has not had considerable effect yet. The ideology idealising business 
life and the market was swept away by the great depression in one or two 
months. I am afraid from this time on, we will hear exclusively the voices of 
criticism (the loudest will be the former preachers of NPM). In the meantime it 
is to be feared that employable solutions will also vanish into thin air (as 
usual), although there were some.  
 As for me, I see two large, basically different areas of state activities. One 
of them is authoritative activity, in which the state proceeds with the instruments 
of power against the citizen, for whom it generally incurs “inconvenience” in 
the interest of the community. The other is the area of public services, which 
became determining primarily with the emergence of welfare states, and as 
such, it is a new state phenomenon, although, the overwhelming majority of 
the resources of the budget is spent on such purposes. In these areas in the 
majority of cases it can be relatively precisely defined who the “consumer” is, 
the party to whom the state provides something, and what the content of the 
service is. Of course, this separation is extemporaneous,51 since several public 
  
 51 The legal conception of Hungarian public administration recognises only the first 
element and construes the second one primarily in this theoretical framework. The Anglo-
Saxon conception, however, regards everything as public service, therefore, construes every-
thing on the basis of the logic of “services”. As for me, I think the unelaborated nature of 
the two theoretical approaches is a great deficiency of the science of public administration. 
The differences and similarities and their consequences are unclear. 
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administrative activities can’t be classified to either area, whereas several 
activities can be classified to both areas. Nevertheless, this separation can ground 
the decision on the application of NPM techniques. Namely, the activity of 
the authority follows a basically different logic from that of the market (it is not 
accidental that this one has been a state activity for several thousand years). 
Whereas, in the area of public services the application of market mechanisms 
can have several advantages.  
 Let me remark that the market is an extraordinarily auspicious feedback 
mechanism for the company. It informs the company rapidly, reliably and 
unambiguously about the market assessment of its achievement via prices. 
What is more, it does not only inform but at the same time also sanctions and 
eventually selects out the company with low achievement according to the 
value judgement of the market. It would be difficult to deny the advantages of 
this mechanism vis-à-vis the political feedback mechanism, which supervenes 
basically at the elections every four years, which is only indirectly related to 
the real achievement of the state and of politicians governing the state and to 
be elected. In case of the state designed to serve the community, the market 
feedback mechanism has a remarkably significant deficiency, namely, that market 
prices do not reflect the scale of values of the society, which contradicts the 
declarations of economists. So far as the state can correct this by representing 
the social values or at least approaching these, the orientation via prices and 
strengthening the competition can be expressly advantageous in several areas 
of public services.  
 
